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PRIVATE SALE OF CONTROL
TRANSACTIONS: WHERE WE
STAND TODAY*
by
Robert W. Hamilton**
The law with regard to privately negotiated "sale of control" transactions is well-
settled. The premium paid for the sale of control of a corporation by majority share-
holders is generally not a corporate asset which must be shared with other sharehold-
er Nor is there any generally accepted principle of "equal opportunity" that permits
other shareholders to participate in the favorable transaction along with the control-
ling shareholder Several exceptions to these principles have been developed by the
common law to prevent abusive transactions these exceptions involve ex post exami-
nation of factual questions and have been criticised by economists of the "Chicago
school" The author of this article evaluates "sale of control" transactions in light of
recent legal economic theory, and concludes that the legal system has created a set of
rules that appear to strike a reasonable balance between considerations of economic
efficiency on the one hand, and simple justice and fairness, on the other.
INTRODUCTION
THE "SALE OF control" transaction discussed in this paper is
well illustrated by the facts of Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc.1
The defendants owned 44.4% of the voting shares of Gable Indus-
tries, Inc. (Gable), a publicly held corporation whose shares were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. This ownership interest
was clearly sufficient to give the defendants effective control over
Gable's affairs. At a time when the market price of Gable's shares
was $8.38, the defendants sold their shares for $15 per share to
Flintkote Co., also a publicly held corporation whose shares were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The court did not ex-
* An earlier version of this Article was submitted in connection with the Canada-
United States Comparative Corporation Law Conference, conducted on October 16-19, 1984,
by the Canada-United States Law Institute (of Case Western Reserve University and the
University of Western Ontario) under the joint sponsorship of Osgoode Hall Law School (of
York University) and the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Support for the conference
was furnished by the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the United States, The Mary
Corling McCrea Foundation, and The George Gund Foundation.
This Article bears a completion date of January 1, 1985.
** The Benno C. Schmidt Chair in Business Law, The University of Texas at Austin
School of Law. B.A., Swarthmore College (1952); J.D., University of Chicago (1955).
1. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979).
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plain why Flintkote was willing to pay nearly twice the market
price for Gable stock, but the reason is obvious: Flintkote was buy-
ing immediate control of Gable, and the difference between $15 and
$8.38 was the premium for obtaining that control.
The transaction was attacked by a minority shareholder of Ga-
ble who argued that all shareholders should be entitled to an oppor-
tunity to share equally in any premium paid for control of a
corporation. Rejecting this argument in a one-page, unsigned mem-
orandum, the New York Court of Appeals cited the "long. . .set-
tled law" that absent "looting of corporate assets, conversion of a
corporate opportunity, fraud, or other acts of bad faith,"2 a control-
ling shareholder is free to sell his shares at whatever price the shares
can command. The premium over market the court explained, re-
flects the amount "an investor is willing to pay for the privilege of
directly influencing the corporation's affairs." 3 Furthermore, the
court continued, the rule of mandatory sharing of the control pre-
mium contended for by the plaintiff would "profoundly affect the
manner in which controlling stock interests are now transferred
[since it would] require, essentially, that [all] controlling interest[s]
[could] be transferred only by public tender offer."' Such a "radical
change" in existing law, the court concluded, should be made by the
legislature and not by the courts.
In one sense, Zetlin does indeed represent "long settled law" set
forth, either in holding or in dictum, in scores of cases.5 There was
a period during the 1960's when it appeared possible that the rule
rejected in Zetlin, requiring sharing of the premium, might be gen-
erally adopted in sale of control cases, but that period has long
passed. The "long settled law" has recently been reaffirmed in an
impressive number of cases.' It is unlikely that any American court
today would reject the general proposition that controlling share-
holders may obtain a premium for their shares which they need not
share with other shareholders. Yet, the fact that a simple, and ap-
parently hopeless, case such as Zetlin would be appealed through
2. Id at 685, 397 N.E.2d at 388.
3. Id, 397 N.E.2d at 389.
4. Id
5. For an early statement to this effect, see Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251
N.Y.S. 221 (1931).
6. Recent cases supporting this statement, in addition to Zetlin, include Doleman v.
Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1984); Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990 (10th
Cir. 1981); Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); and Haberman
v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972).
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two levels of New York courts reflects continued unease and uncer-
tainty about this "long settled law."
Part of this uneasiness is doubtless a result of the fact that most
academic commentary on the sale of control issue-including that
of many of the most respected academic writers in the corporations
law field between 1930 and 1970-has been critical of it.' They ar-
gue with great intensity that "control" is a corporate asset, and the
premium should be recoverable by the corporation, or that the pre-
mium should be shared proportionally by all the shareholders
through the principle of "equal opportunity" to participate in the
desirable sale transaction. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that
the sheer weight of this commentary demonstrates that its basic the-
sis is correct. However, it was not until the recent writings of the
"Chicago School" of legal economics that the "long settled law"
received any substantial degree of academic support.8
7. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 216-17 (rev. ed. 1968); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965); Berle, The Price of Power Sale of Corporate
Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 1212 (1958); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control,
65 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1966); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1
(1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956). See gener-
ally O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U.
PI=r. L. REv. 9 (1976).
In a somewhat different category is a series of articles by Professor Bayne, who seeks to
establish that the payment of control premiums is morally illegitimate and a "bribe." See
Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L.J. 317 (1970); Bayne, The Sale-
of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX. L. REv. 215 (1969); Bayne, The
Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1969); Bayne, The Sale-of-
Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 615 (1969); Bayne, A Legitimate
Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REv. 438
(1966); Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEo. L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne, The
Sale-of-Control Quandry, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 49 (1965); Bayne, The Definition of Corporate
Control, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445 (1965); Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAM
L. REV. 583 (1965); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1963).
8. The most detailed explanation of the economic analysis of the control premium issue
appears in Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control]. See also R. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.6 at 303-05 (2d ed. 1977). Other writings of the "Chicago
School" that are relevant to the control premium issue include Fischel, Efficient Capital Mar-
ket Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
Tax. L. REv. 1 (1978) and Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role].
Two early defenses of the traditional rule, written in response to Professor Andrew's
"equal opportunity" article, are Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares:
A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 420 (1965) and Comment, Sales of Corpo-
rate Control and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 725 (1964).
250 [Vol. 36:248
PRIVATE SALE OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Two other factors contributing to the general uneasiness about
the "long settled law" also deserve mention. The first is the intui-
tive feeling by many persons-lawyer and layman alike-that tak-
ing a premium for control is inherently suspect in some situations.
Zetlin is not one of those situations; in that case, both the corpora-
tion whose shares were being acquired and the acquirer of them
were subject to the public disclosure requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.' Further, the number of shares being sold
(44.4%) certainly constituted working control of a publicly held
corporation, and there was no evidence that the transaction actually
harmed the corporation or its remaining shareholders in any way.
The situation is not so clear, however, where the corporation is
closely held, so that the minority shareholders do not have a "mar-
ket option" and may face serious difficulty in obtaining information
about the corporation's affairs; where the number of shares being
sold is so small that they would not normally carry with them con-
trol of a publicly held corporation; where the non-control share-
holders are simultaneously offered significantly lower prices for
their shares; or where the purchaser thereafter significantly harms
the corporation.10 Second, several well-recognized exceptions or
qualifications to the "long settled law" about control premiums ex-
ist. These exceptions are not readily bounded or limited and
threaten to swallow up all, or the greater part of, the general princi-
ple. These exceptions, discussed in a later section of this Article,
are usually described under the phrases "looting," "corporate op-
portunity," "sale of corporate office," and more recently, "fiduciary
duties." All in all, this "long settled law" with its well-recognized
exceptions seems ripe for reconsideration in light of recent cases
and the new writings of the "Chicago School.""
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1984).
10. Other variations also exist. For example, some corporations, such as mutual insur-
ance or mutual savings and loan associations, have extremely diffuse voting populations. In a
mutual insurance company, for example, every policyholder is entitled to vote. Sale of con-
trol of such an organization may take the form of a sale of an affiliated corporation, where
both are under the common control of a small group. See infra notes 63-64 and accompany-
ing text.
11. An additional motivating factor was my participation in the Canada-United States
Comparative Corporation Law Conference (Cleveland, Ohio, Oct., 1984), held under the aus-
pices of the Canada-United States Law Institute. A major benefit of this Conference, in addi-
tion to my exposure to the Canadian experience, was the presence of economists who were
willing, indeed anxious, to explain the economists' view of the phenomenon under discussion.
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I. THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF SALE OF CONTROL PREMIUMS
The basic argument made by economists in favor of the "long
settled law" set forth in Zetlin involves two propositions: (1) trans-
actions involving the sale or transfer of control are generally benefi-
cial to the entity in particular, and to the economy in general, since
such transfers tend to cause corporate resources to be put to higher
and better uses;12 and (2) many desirable transfers of control would
not take place if some kind of sharing-of-the-premium rule were es-
tablished. Such a rule would either increase the cost of transferring
control or reduce the premium paid to the selling controlling share-
holders, thereby making some sellers unwilling to complete the
transaction. These two propositions will be addressed in reverse
order.
The correctness of the second conclusion-that a sharing rule
would reduce the number of sale of control transactions-seems to
be self-evident. To meet the sharing requirement, the purchaser of
control might offer the same premium price to all the shareholders,
thereby increasing the purchase obligation from whatever percent-
age of the shares were owned by the selling controlling shareholders
to as much as 100% of the shares. Alternatively, the purchaser
might decline to increase the size of his purchase. The selling share-
holders would then be compelled to share the benefits of the higher
price with some or all of the other shareholders, thereby reducing
the portion of the control premium the controlling shareholders
may keep for themselves. 3 In either event, sale of control transac-
tions would be less frequent.
On the other hand, I do not find the first proposition-that pri-
vately negotiated transfers of control are generally beneficial-to be
either self-evident or supported by persuasive empirical evidence. It
may be asserted, of course, that such a proposition is so self-evident
12. Easterbrook & Fischel state the following in Corporate Control, supra note 8, at 705:
The sale of a control bloc of stock ... allows the buyer to install his own manage-
ment team, producing the same gains available from a tender offer for a majority of
shares but at lower cost to the buyer. Because such a buyer believes he can manage
the assets of a firm more profitably, he is willing to pay a premium over the market
price to acquire control. The premium will be some percentage of the anticipated
increase in value once the transfer of control is effectuated. If there were no antici-
pated increase in value, it would be irrational for the buyer to pay the premium.
There is a strong presumption, therefore, that free transferability of corporate con-
trol, like any other type of voluntary exchange, moves assets to higher valued uses.
13. Conceivably, the selling shareholders might be required to retain a minority interest
in the enterprise, permitting other shareholders to sell a fraction of their holdings to the
purchaser at the premium price. This, too, would reduce the frequency of sale of control
transactions, since selling shareholders would presumably not elect to remain as minority
shareholders in many situations.
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or intuitively obvious that it does not require empirical verification,
but I would hope such an assertion will not persuade either econo-
mists (who pride themselves on discovering counter-intuitive pro-
positions) or lawyers (who are familiar, primarily, with real-life
illustrations where such transfers were in fact not beneficial and did
cause substantial harm to the shareholders "left behind"). Cer-
tainly, such a proposition is one that can be studied empirically, at
least in the case of publicly held corporations such as Gable Indus-
tries. However, as with many other propositions confidently as-
serted in the field of economics, there do not appear to be direct and
persuasive studies or empirical data to support the economists'
proposition.
In a broad sense, the first proposition appears to be based on the
rather controversial economic conclusion that takeovers of publicly
held corporations by case tender offers are generally desirable.14
Privately negotiated sales of controlling shares are at least superfi-
cially analogous. In the case of tender offers, economists suggest
that the societal gain can be measured by comparing the tender of-
fer price with the prior market value of the shares of the target,
reduced by any decline in value of the shares of the aggressor. 5
Empirical evidence apparently establishes that there is usually a
net increase in value of the two corporations measured in this
way. 6 The explanation usually given for this net increase in market
value is that takeovers eliminate less efficient management and tend
to cause economic resources to be put to a higher (more efficient)
use. This explanation is almost an article of faith among economists
since, otherwise, takeovers at premium prices are irrational and not
explainable by rational profit-maximizing. 7 Its correctness, how-
14. In a letter to the author, Professor Easterbrook suggested that a study relating to
tender offers, Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J.
Bus. 345 (1980), showed shares not acquired pursuant to the offer also appreciated in value
following the transaction. He also suggested block accumulation studies, which examined
price movements in publicly held shares following the assembling of a large and potentially
controlling block of shares, also show that the "left-out" shares increase in value following
the block assemblage and decline in value upon disassemblage. The studies are cited in Jen-
sen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Controk The Scientifc Evidence, 11 J. FiN. EcON.
5, 38-39 (1983), in the context of the effect of repurchase of such blocks by the corporation,
usually at a premium over market.
15. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation,
83 CoLuM. L. REv. 249, 274 (1983).
16. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Controk The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FiN. ECON. 5 (1983).
17. The legal literature taking this position largely pivots around Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role, supra note 8. See also Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
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ever, does not appear to accord with anecdotal evidence from the
real world, at least since 1982,18 or with comments and descriptions
from "players" in the takeover game during the same period.19 As
a result, recent commentary has increasingly refused to accept these
economically derived conclusions as a matter of simple faith.20
There is, furthermore, a considerable difference between the as-
sembling of a control block by way of a tender offer to widely scat-
tered shareholders and the private, negotiated purchase of a control
block from a small group of shareholders. A tender offer is subject
to disclosure requirements which assure that some information is
available about the offerors. A sale of a controlling block, however,
Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1982); Carney, Shareholder Coordina-
tion Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983
A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 341; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 8; Easter-
brook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982);
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments:
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1982); Gilson, Seek-
ing Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51
(1982). This extensive legal literature contains citations to the voluminous economics litera-
ture that discusses the same phenomena.
18. It appears likely that most takeover targets are not concentrated in corporations
having current management problems. Rather, the aggressors usually seek well-managed
targets and try to encourage their managements to remain in place after the takeover. This is
obviously not true in all cases; it may not be true, for example, in certain oil industry mergers
where the aggressors' plan is to dismantle all or part of the target corporation. A second
phenomenon that appears to be inconsistent with the "inefficient management" thesis is the
development of the "pac man" defense, when the target seeks to take over the aggressor as a
defensive measure. There is also often a surprisingly short period of time for a corporation to
go from the status of aggressor to that of target. See generally Coffee, Regulating the Market
for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Govern-
ance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984). Of course, these phenomena may have economic
explanations consistent with the general "pruning deadwood" hypothesis.
19. Peter Drucker has recently pointed out that most shares of publicly held corpora-
tions are now held by institutional investors, many of which have fiduciary duties to other
persons to maximize the short-term profitability of their investments. Wall St. J., Oct. 30,
1984, at 14, col. 3. This emphasis on short-term market profitability, Drucker suggests, is
damaging to the long-term well-being of American industry, since longer-term considerations
(which may motivate individual investors) do not enter into institutional investors'
calculations.
20. See Coffee, supra note 18; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation
of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647 (1984); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lowenstein, supra note 15.
The response of economists (to Professor Lowenstein's article in particular) was vitriolic.
See, e.g., Separate Statement of Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCII) No. 1028, 70, 117-18 (July 15, 1983). The data in this Statement forms the basis
for Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 277 (1984).
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may be negotiated with no disclosure and virtual secrecy as to the
identity of the purchaser.
The price in a tender offer is set on the basis of market consider-
ations, including the market price of the shares, the probable public
shareholder response to a higher price, and the likelihood of com-
peting bids. This price is publicly known and widely discussed, and
the opportunity exists for competing bidders to offer a higher price.
In a private sale of control, on the other hand, the price is privately
negotiated with no public input until after the transaction is
closed.21 Finally, the premium over current market price in a
tender offer is a type of control premium, but all shareholders, at
least theoretically, have an opportunity to vie for a portion of that
premium by tendering their shares; in the private sale of control, the
controlling shareholders seize the entire premium.
The leading article on the economists' analysis of sale of control
transactions is by Easterbrook and Fischel.22 They demonstrate
their analysis with the following illustration:
A sharing requirement also may make an otherwise profitable
transaction unattractive to the prospective seller of control. To
illustrate, suppose that the owner of a control block of shares
finds that his perquisites or the other amenities of his position are
worth $10. A prospective acquiror of control concludes that, by
eliminating these perquisites and other amenities, he could pro-
duce a gain of $15. The shareholders in the company benefit if
the acquiror pays a premium of $11 to the owner of the control-
ling block, ousts the current managers, and makes the contem-
plated improvements. The net gains of $4 inure to each investor
according to his holdings, and although the acquiror obtains the
largest portion because he holds the largest block, no one is left
out. If the owner of the control block must share the $11 pre-
mium with all of the existing shareholders, however, the deal col-
lapses. The owner will not part with his block for less than a $10
premium. A sharing requirement would make the deal unprofit-
able to him, and the other investors would lose the prospective
gain from the installation of better managers.23
21. If the sale of control involves an immediate substitution of directors nominated by
the purchaser, for directors elected previously by the shareholders, federal law may require
some disclosure to shareholders before the transfer of control is effected. See infra text ac-
companying notes 74-78.
22. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 8.
23. Id. at 709-10. They continue their discussion in a footnote:
The common law recognizes that unequal distribution of gains facilitates the trans-
fer of assets to higher-valued uses. Someone who discovers a lode of ore need not
share the knowledge (and the profits) with the farmer under whose land the ore lies
but may, instead, send an agent to buy the farm for the going price of farmland. A
sharing requirement would lead to less searching for ore and lower wealth for
society.
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There are several problems with this kind of analysis, however.
The hypothetical the authors create assumes the correctness of their
thesis. The assumption that the purchasers of control will reduce
the "perquisites or the other amenities" enjoyed as a result of the
seller's position by $10, thereby producing a corporate gain of $15,
illustrates that situations may exist in which unequal division is nec-
essary for the realization of societally desirable transactions. It does
not, however, bear directly on Easterbrook and Fischel's basic the-
sis. One can equally plausibly assume that the buyer feels that he
can enjoy the same "perquisites or the other amenities" as the seller
enjoyed, and even increase them to, for instance, $14.24 On this
assumption, the minority shareholders are clearly worse off as a re-
sult of the sale, and both the purchaser and seller of the control
shares are benefiting at the minority shareholders' expense.
The critical question is: Which assumption is more realistic? I
suspect, from personal experience, that losses occur from the
change of managements, particularly in smaller unlisted companies,
in a large number of cases; quite possibly more often than net gains.
In this respect, Professor Ronen's analysis of sale of control
transactions is strongly supportive. On the basis of largely theoreti-
cal economic analysis, he concludes that under the assumptions of
either complete absence of information or asymmetric information,
private sales of control stand at least a 50% chance of being harm-
ful to the shareholders "left behind" and quite possibly the
probability is higher." Absence of information or asymmetric in-
formation is, of course, much more common in the real world than
complete information, particularly in the case of unlisted
companies.
There is another problem with the Easterbrook-Fischel hypo-
thetical. Assume that the control stock sold in the hypothetical
consists of 55% of the outstanding shares; if the buyers are content
to allow the $15 increase in value to remain in the corporation, they
will obtain 55% of the $15 increase in value by reason of their 55%
stock ownership, or $8.25. In other words, if they abandon the
"perquisites and other amenities," they will pay $11 in order to ob-
Id. at 710 n.30. See Leitch Gold Mines v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 1 Ont. 2d 469 (1969).
24. Alternatively, it may be argued that if $14 could be safely siphoned off, the seller
would previously have done it. However, there is no reason to assume that the seller is
particularly efficient at obtaining the maximum "percs;" indeed it may well be inefficiency in
this regard by the seller that makes the transaction appear favorable to the buyer.
25. Ronen, The Sale of Controlling Interest by a Dominant Shareholder to a Third Party:
A Financial Economic Analysis of the Governing Law in the United States and Canada, 61
(Oct. 18, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
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tain an increase in investment value of only $8.25. They would ob-
viously be better off if they retain the sellers' "percs" worth $10 and
seek to squeeze out another couple of dollars here and there from
additional "percs," rather than eliminating the "percs." Using
Easterbrook and Fischel's analysis, one would expect sale of control
transactions to occur only when the selling shareholders are ex-
tremely inefficient managers, or where most of the corporate stock
is being sold. The lower the percentage of the stock being sold, the
higher must be the potential gains from the transfer of control, if
the minority shareholders "left behind" are to benefit from the
change of control. There is no reason to think these possible infer-
ences reflect the reality of sale of control transactions.
The basic question is: If the new purchasers are rational profit
maximizers, why should they share the $15 increase in value with
the minority? It is not true that minority shareholders always share
ratably in all increases in value with the majority shareholders. It
would appear to be rational (and certainly practical) to place the
minority shareholders on "starvation returns" from the corporation
while increasing salaries or other "percs" to the new controlling
shareholders in order to obtain all the additional $15 in gains.2 6
Why should the minority be given any of it? Starvation returns
may also persuade the minority to sell their shares at low prices to
the majority so that at some time thereafter the purchasers may
own all of the outstanding shares and obtain all of the benefits of
their skills. In short, I do not view hypothetical examples, such as
those put forth by Easterbrook and Fischel, to prove anything more
than that there may be idealized situations where everyone is better
off as a result of the transfer of control; they do not prove that there
are such situations, or their frequency.
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel supplement their argument
that control transactions benefit those "left behind" with two fur-
ther arguments. The first is, using the facts of the Zetlin case as
illustrative, that the market for the Gable shares following the
purchase by Flintkote will reveal that the shareholders were better
off as the result of the sale if the price of the Gable shares rose
"relative to the market as a whole."27 Precisely how this is to be
measured is not spelled out. Further, no data is cited to show that
such a price rise usually occurs in sale of control cases.2 8
26. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
27. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 8, at 707.
28. This is not to say that an estimate of this performance cannot be obtained. But,
unless there are one or more publicly held corporations with which to make comparisons, any
19851
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Finally, the authors recognize that data indicates investors tend
to be risk averse (and therefore might prefer a sharing-of-the-pre-
mium principle to the greater risk of higher or lower returns that
inevitably accompany a sale of control to unknown third parties).
Nevertheless, they suggest that the risk of loss from such transac-
tions may be protected against by portfolio diversification,29 a point
which certainly has some limited validity. If all actors in a sale of
control case-the corporation itself, the seller of the control shares,
and the purchaser of the control shares-are publicly held corpora-
tions, then any investor may share at least partially in all aspects of
the sale of control game simply by holding shares in any one of the
three participants, or in other corporations that assume the roles of
these participants in different transactions.3 °
But diversification also assumes that all the shareholders in the
corporation whose control shares are being acquired have liquid (or
at least "liquidable") investments so that they can diversify without
substantial cost if they wish to do so. Unfortunately these assump-
tions often are not true in the real world. Indeed, they do not ap-
pear to be fully true in any of the leading sale of control cases, since
in these cases, the seller of control is usually an individual or group
of individuals and not a corporation, so that it is usually not possi-
ble to invest directly in the seller. Also, diversification is sometimes
not practical except at unacceptable costs. Further, Professors Eas-
terbrook and Fischel note, if one or more of the corporations are
closely held, diversification may be impractical except at substantial
and unacceptable loss. The authors suggest that the "shareholder
can minimize this nondiversifiable risk. . by not investing in firms
that are controlled by an individual or a privately held firm."31
Again this sometimes may not be practical.
All in all, there is something a little unrealistic in these supple-
mentary arguments. At best, they are valid in only certain situa-
tions and are of the "defects in my argument are not very serious"
such estimate must necessarily be imprecise and have substantial qualifications. Easterbrook
and Fischel do refer to price data about Newport Steel Corporation. Those data show the
price of Newport went up somewhat following the sale of control; whether it went up "rela-
tive to the market as a whole" is not directly addressed, though the authors refer to an
unpublished study which suggests that such a rise did occur. Id. at 718.
29. Id at 712.
30. Professor Cox has convincingly demonstrated that even if all shares are publicly
held, it will usually be impossible to achieve a properly balanced portfolio of securities to
assure protection against disproportionate benefits obtained by a controlling person. Cox,
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 751-55 (1984).
31. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 8, at 714.
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type. Fundamentally, it is not very persuasive to argue that certain
broad classes of transactions are not harmful because persons who
are likely to be injured by them may in some limited subclasses of
those transactions insure or protect against that injury through di-
versification of investment or by not making certain investments in
the first place.
On the other hand, the arguments which Easterbrook and Fis-
chel are attacking rely heavily on appeals to purely intuitive notions
of equity and fundamental fairness. Arguments that the purchaser
of a majority of the stock is in fact buying control of 100% of the
assets of the corporation appear in the academic literature. Since
the premium, in fact, relates to the control of all of the assets, why
should a limited group of shareholders be able to acquire the entire
premium when they sell only a portion of all of the shares?32 Such
an argument is intuitive and rhetorical, not analytic.
Another type of argument, however, may be subject to analysis:
The risks of the shareholders who are "left behind" following the
sale of control shares to a third person are clearly different from the
risks faced before the sale of the controlling block. For example,
the purchaser may be less experienced than the seller or may be
more greedy in the search for perquisites that accompany the con-
trol of a corporation. The selling shareholders entirely control the
decision to whom they should sell and reap the benefits of the sale
but suffer none of the adverse consequences of their choice. An
"equal opportunity" requirement simply requires the majority
shareholders to assume the same risk to which they are subjecting
the minority shareholders.
Economists tend to reject the underlying premise that the possi-
bility of losing transactions is large and may outnumber the success-
ful transactions. In their view, "in the long run," the possibility of
losing transactions should disappear because persons who pay too
much for control will eventually have to withdraw from the market
while the winning participants (those who accurately gauge the
inefficiency of incumbent management and who provide more effec-
tive use of corporate resources) will continue to be active. Such
reasoning, however, is also unrealistic in the real world because it
assumes that the number of players is limited.
In fact, there are probably an unlimited number of persons will-
ing to pay a premium for control over a larger group of assets with
the hope that somehow they may hit upon a successful management
32. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 20, at 660.
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strategy. As a result, there may be probable losers entering the
game all the time who have not learned from prior failures of
others. Thus, there may be no discernible trend towards selection
of the successful; the number of potential losing players may always
outnumber the potential winning players; and, on balance, minority
shareholders may lose more often than they win.
Even if one accepts the hypothesis that losses are at least as
likely as gains following the sale of control, the desirability of the
"long settled law" seems open to criticism: Why should the share-
holders "left behind" share this 50-50 risk exclusively (and involun-
tarily, since they have no say in the identity of the buyer) while the
majority shareholder does not? To argue, as Easterbrook and Fis-
chel appear to do, that the minority shareholders took this risk
when they "voluntarily" invested in a minority position in a con-
trolled corporation, seems weak. It assumes that investors have far-
seeing vision as to consequences or outcomes of current transactions
that is often in fact not the case.33
Ultimately, the theoretical arguments for and against the "long
settled law" settle to those of inference or assertion versus counter-
inference or counter-assertion. The noneconomic analysis of well-
known academicians such as Berle, Andrews, Jennings, and others,
comes down to the intuitive argument that sales of control by con-
trolling shareholders have a significant capacity for mischief and
should be subjected to a prophylactic rule: that the premium
should belong either to the corporation or, on a proportional basis,
to all the shareholders. 34 These views appear to have been shaped
33. I know of no study that tries to establish how unprotected minority shareholders in
closely held corporations attained that status. I suspect that most arise from two major
sources: the unexpected or unplanned-for death of a participant in the venture (resulting
either in the transfer of controlling shares to younger generations or the interjection of a
spouse or children into an ongoing closely held venture which the other participants organ-
ized and continue to operate) or an unexpected falling out between persons formerly coopera-
tively active in the management of the business.
Sophisticated persons, who "voluntarily" assume minority status, normally insist on a
buy-out or similar arrangement so that they will be able to liquidate their investment if mat-
ters do not work out as expected. They do not, in my experience, typically pay a lower price
because of the lack of marketability as suggested in Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal
Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 845 (1984).
Unsophisticated persons may, of course, enter "voluntarily" into a minority position in
the corporation with no buy-out protection if they receive no legal or business advice as to the
need to protect themselves from possible mistreatment. From the standpoint of the econo-
mist, all this is apparently irrelevant; in the world of rational profit maximizers, no tears are
shed for the unsophisticated or for the person who inherits from someone who failed to make
a rational provision for the future control of the enterprise.
34. See supra note 7.
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by a handful of famous cases decided during the 1950's and 1960's
and seem to have little relevance to the facts of a typical case such
as Zetlin. The criticism that these views emphasize justice, to the
total exclusion of considerations of efficiency, may therefore have
considerable merit. On the other hand, the economists supporting
the "long settled law" assert that these famous cases are either
wrong or atypical and argue (almost as a matter of faith) that sale of
control transactions are generally beneficial economically to all con-
cerned and that considerations of efficiency strongly support the
view that a general sharing principle is undesirable.
In one way, the supporters of the efficiency analysis seem to
have somewhat the better of the argument. Lawyers in corporate
practice are aware that sale of control transactions occur relatively
frequently in a wide variety of circumstances and with a variety of
different premiums. Even when these transactions do not turn out
well from the standpoint of the shareholders "left behind," the re-
sults are often not catastrophic, and it is possible that the minority
stock may be later bought out on an acceptable basis. In this con-
nection, it may be relevant that the number of litigated instances of
really "bad" cases, where the remaining shareholders have been sig-
nificantly injured, has been relatively small.
II. WHY HAS THE ACADEMIC COMMENTARY BEEN SO
INEFFECTIVE IN CAUSING A CHANGE IN THE
"LONG SETTLED LAW" RELATING
TO CONTROL PREMIUMS?
The lively and continuing theoretical debate about sale of con-
trol cases has not led courts to reconsider the correctness, as an
original matter, of the "long settled law." Indeed, the bulk of the
cases arising in the recent past that strongly endorse the "long set-
tled law" usually refer to, and expressly reject, the academic com-
mentary urging that a sharing principle be adopted.35 This judicial
35. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1984) (no court
has accepted these views "as a basis for general recovery of the control premium"); Treadway
Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (no duty on part of noncontrol-
ling shareholder to maximize return of other shareholders); Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d
1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978) (the position set forth in the academic commentary, "while nice
theoretically, is simply not the law"); Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972)
(sale of stock above market value does not indicate sale at premium; no sale of office where
price for stock was fixed before discussion of resignations); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d
545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969) ("We have read the law review articles cited by counsel and con-
clude that they neither state the law of the forum nor the rules generally applied in other
jurisdictions."); Ritchie v. McGrath, I Kan. App. 2d 481, 571 P.2d 17 (1977) (sale of control-
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response, I believe, is not based so much on the acceptance of argu-
ments about economic "efficiency" as it is on concern by courts
about interfering in an arms-length commercial transaction when
there is no apparent harm to anyone. The notion that lawful prop-
erty may be sold by a willing seller, for whatever price it will bring,
to a willing purchaser is so fundamental that courts appear unwill-
ing to graft an exception onto that principle in the absence of clear
and visible harm to the corporation or the other shareholders.36 As
a corollary, when the selling shareholder owns a majority of the
shares, the sale of those shares ineluctably carries with it the power
to elect a majority of the board of directors; the argument that con-
trol itself is being sold is much less persuasive in this situation. In
the absence of specific harm, then, courts have simply been unwill-
ing to impose, on their own and without express legislative support,
obligations in excess of those voluntarily assumed by the parties
upon the sale of controlling shares. Or, put another way, courts
have been unwilling to generalize judicially created principles,
evolved in cases involving clear and substantial harm to minority
shareholders from the transfer of control, to cases not involving any
apparent harm.
III. THE ESTABLISHED EXCEPTIONS TO THE "LONG
SETTLED LAW" THAT CONTROL PREMIUMS
NEED NOT BE SHARED
When one turns to the famous cases in which liability has been
imposed on selling shareholders in sale of control transactions, one
encounters broad and potentially troubling doctrine that logically
might apply in many, if not all, cases. As indicated in the previous
section, however, these logical extensions have not in fact occurred.
In this section, I consider theories of liability applicable to all cor-
ling shares at premium does not violate Kansas' "very strict fiduciary duty" to shareholders);
Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979).
36. Language often quoted to this effect appears in Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (10th
Cir. 1937), where the court referred to:
the weight of authority ... to the effect that every stockholder, including a major-
ity holder, is at liberty to dispose of his shares at any time and for any price to
which he may agree without being liable to other stockholders under circumstances
such as we have here as long as he does not dominate, interfere with, or mislead
other stockholders in exercising the same rights.
Id. at 69.
Similar comments appear in earlier decisions, such as Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520,
523, 111 A. 22, 23 (1920), where the court commented that a corporate president "had a
perfect right, as an individual," to buy or sell stock in the corporation.
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porations. In the following section, I consider unique arguments
applicable to corporations that are privately held.
A. Looting
In several cases, liability has been imposed on controlling share-
holders who sell their shares to "looters," persons who thereafter
criminally convert the assets of the corporation to their own pur-
poses. 37 The persons injured by looters are, of course, creditors,
preferred shareholders, and the remaining common shareholders-
all those interests that are "left behind." The looting exception is
based entirely on a judicially created duty imposed on selling share-
holders to investigate the bona fides of potential purchasers when
circumstances indicate that the purchasers may plan to loot the
corporation.
In the leading case of Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal
Corp. ,38 the court stated, without citation of authority, that those
who control a corporation "owe some duty to the corporation in
respect of the transfer of control to outsiders," and the law "has
long ago reached the point where it is recognized that such persons
may not be wholly oblivious of the interests of everyone but them-
selves, even in the act of parting with control. . . ,"I The imposi-
tion of liability on the sellers involves a two-step factual analysis:
(1) are the circumstances surrounding the proposed transfer such as
to awaken suspicion and put a prudent person on guard that looting
is probable; and (2) if so, would a reasonably adequate investigation
have disclosed to a reasonable person that looting was likely to re-
sult. Since judicial evaluation of these factual issues necessarily in-
volves an ex post analysis of facts developed at a trial, courts have
tried to avoid relying on hindsight and to estimate the circum-
stances as they must have appeared to the selling shareholders at
the time.
37. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940);
DeBaun v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1975); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Dale v. Thomas H. Tem-
ple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948).
In other cases, looting transactions occurred but the court declined to impose liability on
the ground that, on the facts of the particular case, the defendants had not been put on notice
of the possible looting. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); Harman v.
Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974); Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 A.D.
208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942). In a large number of other cases not involving looting transac-
tions, dicta recognizing the existence of this exception appears. See, eg., Zetlin v. Hanson
Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979).
38. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
39. Id. at 25.
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Courts have held that the following circumstances should have
warned the seller of impending looting: the receipt of a credit re-
port showing numerous unsatisfied judgments against, and bank-
ruptcy filings by, entities of which the potential purchaser had
control;' an offer to purchase shares at an unreasonably high price
considering the assets in question, coupled with indications that the
purchaser was interested in obtaining control of liquid assets imme-
diately upon the sale, and knowledge that the corporation had been
the victim of looting several years earlier;4 1 and, under similar cir-
cumstances with respect to the price, the obvious interest of the pur-
chaser in getting his hands on the liquid assets of the corporation
immediately after the sale.42 Emphasis on an unexpectedly
favorable price, plus the clear interest of the purchaser in obtaining
immediate control of the liquid assets of the corporation as
promptly as possible, by themselves plausibly justify a "go slow"
attitude on the part of the seller. There is the obvious possibility
that the purchaser will use the assets of the corporation purchased
to complete the payment of the purchase price (or to repay over-
night loans used for that purpose).
In contrast, one court concluded that no duty of inquiry was
created where the purchaser appeared to be entirely reputable, sup-
plied GAAP certified financial statements, and the actions of the
purchaser were consistent with those of a reputable purchaser of a
corporation.43 In this case, the actions of the purchaser seemed to
be highly suspicious only with the benefit of hindsight. In another
case, the court held that a duty of inquiry was not created where the
selling price was reasonable, and the selling shareholders received
oral assurances from third persons that the purchaser was reputa-
ble.' In this case, even a superficial examination of the purchaser's
financial statements would have created suspicion, given the size of
the proposed transaction.
In one troublesome case,45 the purchasers paid controlling
shareholders $43.75 for each share of Laurel Harness Racing Asso-
ciation, Inc. (an owner of a harness racing track in Maryland) at a
time when market quotations for the stock were between $7.50 and
$10.00 per share. The court held, over one dissent, that this gross
40. DeBaun, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 691-92, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
41. Insuranshares, 35 F. Supp. at 25-26.
42. Gerdes, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 651, 654.
43. Swinney, 480 F.2d at 573.
44. Harman, 374 F. Supp. at 1149.
45. Clagett v. Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
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disparity in price was not of itself a sufficiently suspicious circum-
stance giving rise to a duty to investigate.4
6
This case is different from the previous ones, however, since
there is no indication that the purchasers actually looted the corpo-
ration; the argument about a duty to investigate was apparently put
forward as a separate basis for imposing liability independently of
any looting that occurred. In other words, the purpose of the suit
was not to hold the selling shareholders liable for losses caused by
the misconduct of the purchasers of the shares, but to require the
selling shareholders to share their very substantial premium with
the plaintiffs. The court pointed out that the large premium was
obviously paid "for the element of control of the corporation,"'
and that Laurel was a commercial business that was subject to fur-
ther growth and development. Much of the real value of the corpo-
ration was apparently the entry it provided into the lucrative horse
racing business in Maryland, which was rigidly controlled by the
state through the limiting of racing dates and the erection of other
artificial barriers against unlimited entry into that business.
Whatever one says about the majority shareholders selling their
stock to capitalize on this asset, this does not appear to be a looting
case, and the court appears to have been correct in not imposing
liability on the sellers for a failure to investigate the buyers.
No case seems to have considered how much of an investigation
the sellers must undertake, once a duty to investigate suspicious cir-
cumstances has arisen. With the development of national credit re-
porting bureaus and agencies, however, an investigation is unlikely
to be very expensive or involved.
The analysis of the economists concerning the looting exception
reveals the difference in approach between lawyers and economists.
At an informal level, there is a tendency by economists who do not
46. But see Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 86, 208 S.W.2d 344, 352
(1948). The court stated: "We find the selling price to the Caldwells ... was so far in excess
of the market in May 1937, as to constitute a badge of fraud." The sale price in this case was
$2.81 per share when the value (based on an independent sale) was $1.00. There was consid-
erable evidence, however, that the sellers were aware (or shortly became aware) that the
purchasers were of questionable background and intended to loot the corporation.
The plaintiffs in Clagett also argued (unsuccessfully) that provisions for a deferred closing
and payment of the purchase price, and a convenant not to change the financial status of the
corporation pending that closing, gave rise to a duty to investigate. Clagett, 583 F.2d at 1261-
63. They also complained that some minority shareholders were selectively given the oppor-
tunity to sell at the $43.75 price, arguing that these sales created an inference that the pur-
chasers' contemplated actions were not in the best interest of the corporation and thus gave
rise to a duty to investigate. Id
47. Ie at 1262.
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have legal training to reject the possibility that outright criminal or
fraudulent conduct is involved; that such conduct is likely to be
very widespread; or that the system should adopt an ex ante rule
designed expressly to deter such conduct. The rational economic
conduct that is the subject of economic analysis apparently does not
seriously take into account the possibility that a person may actu-
ally take advantage of an opportunity to steal and then disappear,
thereby presumably forfeiting the opportunity to engage in rational
profit-maximizing conduct in the future. On the other hand, Pro-
fessor Ronen plausibly points out that a rule of no responsibility for
looting transactions under any circumstances might encourage sales
to looters, since they would be able to pay higher premiums than a
purchaser engaged in purely lawful economic conduct.48
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize the possibility that criminal
conduct may occur and also recognize that the economic system
may not make such conduct "self-deterring." '49 They conclude,
however, that it is undesirable to attempt to prevent looting from
within the economic system by an ex ante rule. Rather, they sug-
gest that "[1looters, when caught, could be heavily fined or impris-
oned, taking into account the frequency with which looting escapes
detection. Penalties for looting could be made high enough to be
effective."5"
This conclusion is based on several assumptions that have ap-
parently never been empirically investigated: (1) that looting trans-
actions are relatively infrequent; (2) that it is "difficult if not
impossible" to detect looters in advance since "a looter takes the
money and runs, and looting is by nature a one-time transaction"; 1
48. Ronen, supra note 25, at 83-85. Professor Ronen also suggests that such a rule
would have adverse effects on the formation and capitalization of new businesses. He con-
cludes by suggesting that a general duty of reasonable investigation should be required in all
cases, though this conclusion may be based in part on his unusual definition of "looting." Id.
at 86-92. See infra text accompanying note 55.
49. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control, supra note 8, at 707:
Of course, some control transactions do not produce gains. In a few instances
changes in control may be attributable to self-aggrandizement of buyers rather than
to gains in the use of acquired firms' assets. We do not think this managerialist
explanation of control shifts is important in designing legal rules. . . .The market
penalizes buyers who pay too much money for a deal, and those losses serve as
signals to further buyers. The corporate law can ignore overpayments, for they are
self-deterring.
Some corporate control transactions that do not produce gains, however, are not
always self-deterring. Looting may explain certain transfers of control.
50. Id. at 719.
51. Id. at 718-19. The authors argue that "[o]nce looters have absconded with the assets
of one firm, they acquire a reputation that prevents them from repeating this act. But when
they first obtain control, they may appear quite innocuous." Id.
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and (3) a requirement that an investigation be made would lead to
some refusals to sell, and "almost all" of these refusals would be
"false positives."52 In other words, they would deter desirable and
non-criminal transactions involving the sale of control. On the ba-
sis of these assumptions, Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that the
"costs of dealing with looting through a system of prior scrutiny
would. . . scotch many valuable control shifts as a byproduct.
'5 3
It is possible that Easterbrook and Fischel are correct when they
infer that the costs of an ex ante requirement exceed its benefits, but
I doubt it. In the first place, in my personal experience, it is not
true that looters abscond and only first-time looters ply their trade.
Rather, persons on the fringe of the law often quietly merge into the
general economy and surface from time to time, hoping that their
background is not discovered, and if it is, quietly disappear again.
As a result, routine and inexpensive credit checks on persons offer-
ing to buy asset-rich companies often turn up substantially negative
factors.
I recall a credit check I ran on a potential purchaser of the con-
trolling interest in an investment adviser to a small investment com-
pany: the potential purchaser turned out to be a "skip" who had
left a trail of unpaid hotel and other bills in over a dozen cities! It
took little imagination to figure out how he was planning to obtain
funds for the purchase price of the shares or what would happen to
the liquid assets in the investment company if the transaction had
been completed. Indeed, the price he was offering for the shares of
the investment adviser seemed so high that I can only assume that
he believed the sellers might be so blinded by greed that they would
accept his offer without making even a routine credit check, since
he had made no effort to disguise his identity. One only needs to
have one experience of this type to become a strong advocate of the
investigative requirement of present law.
Second, while it is possible that the ex ante investigation would
turn up some "false positives," I do not see why this should be so.
What is supposed to be investigated is not whether the purchaser
has dismantled companies in the past, but whether he has a reputa-
tion for honesty and the apparent wherewithal to finance a transac-
tion of the magnitude under consideration without recourse to the
corporation's assets in a way that defrauds creditors and minority
52. Id.
53. Id.
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shareholders.54 If a person does not meet this standard, one won-
ders whether he is really a "false positive."
Finally, the ex post deterrence proposed by Easterbrook and Fis-
chel in the form of criminal sanctions is not very attractive. Even if
it is assumed that punishment for this type of conduct will be quick
and sure-hardly characteristics of current criminal sanctions
against white-collar crime-the result is that the innocent share-
holders and others "left behind" will usually suffer the entire eco-
nomic loss, while the majority shareholders who sold to the thieves
may keep the entire purchase price, premium and all. The thieves,
of course, go to jail. This result seems so obviously unjust from the
standpoint of the minority shareholders that it seems unreasonable
to embrace it on the basis of entirely theoretical considerations of
economic "efficiency."
Professor Ronen adopts a definition of "looting" as the "com-
bined outcome of skill and consumption of nonpecuniary benefits"
by corporate managers." This definition makes "looting" a mere
extension of the "perquisites" that, in economic theory, managers of
business take when they are not the sole residual owners of the en-
terprise. 6 This definition differs significantly from the definition
adopted in the cases: looting as criminal conduct rather than mar-
ginally lawful conduct. The remedy provided for selling to a looter
(in the criminal sense) in the cases described here is draconian. It
makes the noninvestigating seller responsible for the entire loss suf-
fered by the corporation through looting. The seller, in effect, be-
comes an insurer of the honesty of his purchaser, and the liability
imposed may exceed by many times the amount of the original pre-
mium obtained. Professor Ronen does not address the remedy issue
squarely, but it seems unlikely that he would indorse.the same type
of remedy for failing to discover a potential for "looting" in the
broader sense in which he uses the term.
54. It is important to distinguish the use of corporate assets in "leveraged buy-outs"
from their use in looting transactions. When the purchaser acquires all the shares of the
corporation, as is the normal pattern in leveraged buy-outs, the purchaser may use the assets
as he wishes, consistent with his obligations to creditors. As a result, he may use corporate
assets to discharge his loans used to purchase the outstanding shares, though it is more com-
mon for the corporation to incur those loans as part of a corporate repurchase of outstanding
shares. It is quite different to use corporate assets to discharge the purchasers' individual
loans when there are minority shareholders; that is looting.
55. Ronen, supra note 25, at 46.
56. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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B. Sale of Office
A more general argument that has found success in some cases
is that the control premium is, in fact, compensation for securing
the immediate resignations of the directors and managing officers;
therefore, what are in fact sold are offices and not shares. The clas-
sic device to effect an immediate transfer of office upon the sale of
controlling shares is a sequence of individual resignations of direc-
tors followed by the selection of successors nominated by the pur-
chaser to fill the vacancies so created. This process of seriatim
resignations and replacements is expressly authorized by modem
business corporation statutes which generally authorize a board of
directors to fill vacancies on the board." This method of transfer-
ring immediate control, it should be noted, is not dependent on the
sale of any particular number of shares, and if the shares being
transferred are less than an absolute majority of the voting shares,
the shareholders will have at least a theoretical opportunity to reject
the new directors at the next regular election of directors. This does
not appear to have occurred, however, in any reported sale of con-
trol case involving the sale of less than an absolute majority of the
outstanding shares.
The sale of office cases start from solid historic foundations. It
has been clear, at least since the nineteenth century, that a cash
payment to an officer or director, in exchange for his resignation
and the appointment of the purchaser as his successor, is improper;
it is a bribe that may give rise to criminal prosecution. 8 It is only a
matter of degree from these cases to those cases involving a desig-
nated side payment for the office in connection with the purchase of
controlling shares.
In Porter v. Healy,59 the majority shareholders sold their shares
at $165 per share. The same price was offered to the minority
shareholders, but, at the same time, a secret escrow fund of over
$86,000 was created to be paid to the majority shareholders when
actual control of the offices of the corporation was turned over to
the purchasers. The transfer of control was effected through the
device of seriatim resignation of directors and appointment of suc-
cessors nominated by the purchasers. The court upheld the lower
court's conclusion that the $86,000 payment involved the sale of the
57. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.10 (1984).
58. The earliest American case involving this proposition is McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y.
78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
59. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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defendants' position, "with the influence flowing therefrom," and
concluded that the defendants were liable for the amount received
from the secret escrow fund.6"
From cases such as this, it is only a small step further to cases
where the side payment is not segregated but is hidden within an
excessive purchase price for a small block of shares where an imme-
diate sale of control is contemplated.6" At this point, the exception
threatens to overwhelm large portions of the general rule: When-
ever the contract of sale provides for the immediate transfer of cor-
porate offices, one can argue that the premium over market price
was the consideration for the immediate sale of office.62
In fact, this exception has not overwhelmed the general rule.
Aside from cases in which a portion (or all) of the purchase price
was allocated expressly to the transfer of offices, this argument has
apparently found application in only two related classes of cases.
1. Corporations whose control is effectively vested in other
entities.
Certain types of corporations have extremely diffuse and inac-
tive voting members. The two most widely known types are: open-
end mutual or money market funds (where the investment is usually
viewed by the "shareholder" as a diversified investment or the
equivalent of a bank deposit), and mutual savings and loan associa-
tions (where each depositor is a voting member). In many in-
stances, de facto control of the corporation is vested in the owners
or managers of investment advisers, insurance brokerage firms, real
estate brokerage or escrow firms, or similar entities that have close
ties with the corporation.
In most instances, the corporation and the affiliated entity are
each under the common control of a small group of persons. In
60. Id. at 436, 91 A. at 431. This case also involved an element of misrepresentation,
since the purchasers represented to the minority shareholders only that the defendants had
also sold at $165 per share. They did not disclose the existence of the separate "control
fund."
61. In Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968), for example, the court
upheld the sufficiency of a complaint charging a sale of office where controlling shares were
sold at a price of $7.00 when the market price was $2.63. The contract of sale was condi-
tional upon the resignations and transfer of control. See also Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y.
157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
62. This argument has less force, of course, when the selling shareholder owns an abso-
lute majority of the voting shares, since the contract provisions then are simply advancing the
time of the inevitable. In addition, it may lose force upon a factual showing that the price
was agreed upon before the provisions relating to immediate transfer of office were consid-
ered. This latter argument was found persuasive in Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305
(2d Cir. 1972).
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other instances, the affiliate may have a contractual or statutory
right to participate in the control of the corporation. In either
event, a "sale of office" argument has sometimes been accepted
when the affiliated entity's shares are sold to third persons at a sub-
stantial premium, and the contract requires or contemplates the se-
riatim replacement of the board of directors of the diffuse
corporation.6 3 These are true "sale of office" cases, since no sub-
stantial equity interest in the diffuse voting power of the corporation
is being simultaneously transferred as justification for the transfer of
the officesf"
2. Transfers of control in connection with the sale of an insignif-
icant fraction of the total voting shares of the corporation.
A second type of case in which a sale of office argument has
sometimes been accepted is the sale of control by a group that owns
a very small fraction of the outstanding voting shares (often less
than 10%).65 Two New York cases decided within the same year
illustrate the application of this principle.
63. Perhaps the most graphic case is Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 282
N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979), which concerned transfer of control of a mutual insurance com-
pany as part of the sale of an affiliated insurance agency under common control. For a simi-
lar holding with respect to a transfer of control of a mutual savings and loan association, see
Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 371 F. Supp. 306
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (transfer of stock at premium of a corporation handling loan escrows, acting
as trustee, and providing life insurance for borrowers from the savings and loan association,
accompanied by transfer of control of that association).
The application of this principle to a sale of the stock of investment advisers to open end
investment companies has generated more controversy. The leading case imposing liability is
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). But see SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254
F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958) (criticized in Comment, Protecting the
Interests of Mutual-fund Investors in Sales of Management-Corporation Control (or, Policing
the Traff c in Other People's Money), 68 YALE L.J. 120 (1959)); Krieger v. Anderson, 182
A.2d 907 (Del. 1962) (criticized in 63 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1963)). Both of these cases
accept the argument that transfer of the ownership of the investment adviser automatically
caused a cancellation of the service contracts under section 15(a)(4) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1983)).
64. It is possible, of course, that the sellers of control may have modest interests in the
corporation, such as small investments in the mutual fund, small deposits in the savings and
loan association, or insurance policies with the mutual insurance corporation. These minor
direct voting interests have never been relied upon as justifying the seriatim resignation of
directors.
65. See, eg., Brecher v. Gregg, 89 Misc. 2d 457, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1975); In re
Caplan's Petition, 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964); see also Nelson v. Gammon, 478
F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (suit dismissed; receipt by selling shareholders of legal fees and
employment contracts did not constitute illegal premiums for transfer of control); Benson v.
Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1956) (complaint charging sale of control by share-
holders (recently victorious in proxy fight) dismissed since there was no showing that the
premium paid was for resignations).
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In In re Caplan's Petition,66 Roy Cohn owned 3% of the stock
of Lionel Corporation but had successfully nominated seven of the
ten directors. Cohn sold his shares on a deferred sale basis, trans-
ferring the voting power and receiving cash immediately, but gave
back promissory notes equal to the amount paid to him; these notes
were to be cancelled under specified circumstances. The contract
included a provision for the seriatim replacement of Roy Cohn's
directors. Since Cohn possessed only 3% of the voting power, the
court viewed the transaction as an attempted sale of office and in-
validated the substitution of directors.
In contrast, in Carter v. Muscat,67 the same court, with two of
four judges sitting in both cases, was faced with a sale of interests
associated with William Zeckendorf, Sr. of 9.7% of the voting
shares of Republic Corporation. The Zeckendorf interests never-
theless controlled six of the eleven directorships. The contract to
sell the shares provided for the immediate substitution of directors.
The price for the shares "was substantially the market price
although slightly higher,"68 and the seriatim resignation of directors
occurring pursuant to the contract was thereafter accurately de-
scribed to the public shareholders. At subsequent shareholders'
meetings, the substituted directors were reelected. Relying in part
on these post-sale developments, the court declined to invalidate the
sale of the 9.7% block as a sale of office. No case has apparently
accepted the sale of office argument when the shares being trans-
ferred are in excess of 10% of the voting shares and the price is not
expressly allocated in part to the sale of control provisions of the
contract.
The validity of contract provisions requiring seriatim resigna-
tions of directors in connection with sales of small percentages of
voting shares also may arise in the context of breach of contract
suits between the buyer and seller, rather than suits brought by
shareholders not party to the contract. In the leading case,69 suit
was brought on a contract to sell about 28% of the stock of the
corporation. The sellers were committed to deliver the resignations
of a majority of the board of directors and to cause the election of
successors nominated by the purchaser at the closing of the transac-
tion. The defendants argued that the contract was against public
policy because of the provisions relating to the transfer of director-
66. 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
67. 21 A.D.2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1964).
68. Id at 544, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
69. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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ships. The case was complicated by reason of the Erie doctrine:
The panel of the Second Circuit was forced to divine New York law
in the absence of any really controlling precedent.
Chief Judge Lumbard argued as follows: (1) if the block being
transferred were a majority of the shares, the clause would not be
against public policy since a majority of the shares inherently car-
ries with it the power to name at least a majority of the board of
directors; (2) it is unlawful to transfer control as such (accompanied
by no stock or insufficient stock to carry voting control); (3) a 28%
interest "is usually tantamount to majority control" in a publicly
held corporation; and (4) the case should therefore be remanded to
determine whether, assuming neutrality on the part of the selling
shareholders, a holder of 28% of the outstanding shares might fail
to obtain the election of its candidates at a regular election.70
Judge Clark concurred in the result, suggesting that the inquiry
proposed by Judge Lumbard required "hypothetical findings" and
should not be determinative of the outcome. Judge Clark also
stated that the agreement did not involve a "naked transfer of cor-
porate office," and there was "no ground for declaring the present
agreement void on its face."7 1 Judge Friendly, starting from a
somewhat different perspective than Judge Clark, suggested tenta-
tively that "if I were sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, I
would hold a provision like Paragraph 6 violative of public policy
save when it was entirely plain that a new election would be a mere
formality, such as where the seller owned more than 50% of the
stock."72
The issue in these cases of the validity of the contract for the
sale of minority shares that contains provisions relating to transfer
of control is quite different from the issue presented by a nonselling
shareholder complaining of the transfer of control. There seems to
be no reason to permit a contractual party to avoid his commitment
because the agreement may injure other parties unless those parties
complain of the injury.7 3
In 1968 Congress added section 14(c) to the Securities Exchange
70. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
71. IaM at 580.
72. Id at 581 (concurring).
73. In Goode v. Powers, 97 Ariz. 75, 397 P.2d 56 (1964), the purchasers of a 25%
interest in the voting shares of an insurance company were sued for the balance of the agreed
purchase price. The defendants argued that the stock was only inherently worth $200 per
share, but was sold for $500 per share because of the transfer of control provisions. Not
surprisingly, this argument was rejected by the court, though some evidence as to valuation
was considered by the trial court.
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Act of 1934.74 That section authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission to require disclosure in connection with sale of control
transactions involving the substitution of directors other than by a
vote of shareholders. Rule 14(f)(1), 7 adopted by the SEC pursuant
to this grant of authority, requires disclosure of substantially the
same information about the new directors as would be required in a
proxy statement in connection with an election by shareholders of
those persons as directors.7 6 This information must be distributed
to all voting shareholders not less than ten days before the date the
new directors are to take office. This requirement, it should be
noted, is only applicable to transfers of directorships of registered
corporations77 in connection with section 13(d) or section 14(d)
transactions (purchases that bring the ownership interest of the
purchaser over 5% of the outstanding voting shares or tender offers
that have the same effect). While it is possible that a transfer of
control may entail less than 5% of the corporation's shares (indeed,
witness Roy Cohn's transfer of control of Lionel Corporation)78 and
thus not be covered by section 14(0, that is not very likely.
C. Corporate Opportunity
Some sale of control cases have been successfully attacked be-
cause they appear to be a disguised usurpation of a corporate oppor-
tunity. In the leading case,7 9 the corporation had virtually its
whole capital invested in a single piece of real estate. An outside
group approached the corporation's president with a proposal that
the corporation sell them the real estate at an attractive price. The
president refused, but then negotiated a transaction by which he
agreed to sell the outside group enough shares to give them control
of the corporation. The president quietly purchased additional
shares from other shareholders to make up the block he had agreed
to sell. After the sale, the outside group, now in control of the cor-
poration, arranged to purchase the real estate from the corporation
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1984).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f(1) (1985).
76. It may be, of course, that legislation such as § 14(0, expressly recognizing the possi-
bility of transfers of control other than by vote of the shareholders, may to some extent be
viewed as legitimizing that practice.
77. In other words, it applies to every corporation with a class of shares registered on a
national securities exchange and every corporation with more than $3,000,000 of assets and
five hundred or more shareholders of record of a class of shares. 15 U.S.C. § 78(1); 47 Fed.
Reg. 17,046 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
78. See supra text accompanying note 66.
79. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910).
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at a price "which was not found to be inadequate," and the corpora-
tion was thereafter apparently dissolved. The principal argument
considered by the court was whether the sale of the stock and the
subsequent sale of the real estate were separate transactions or were
part of a single transaction. The court treated them as a single
transaction and required the defendants to account to the remaining
shareholders for their profits.
Relatively few sale of control cases fit so neatly into a corporate
opportunity cubby-hole.80 Perhaps the most famous of all sale of
control cases, Perlman v. Feldmann,"l probably does fall into this
category, however. During the Korean war, steel capacity was in
great demand, and a "gray market" had developed because of feder-
ally imposed price restraints. Newport Steel Corporation was a rel-
atively inefficient steel producer, but, because of the steel shortage,
was enjoying unusual prosperity. A distant end-user of steel, Wil-
port Steel Company, approached Feldmann, the president and a di-
rect or indirect owner of 33% of the outstanding shares of Newport,
with a merger proposal. Feldmann rejected this proposal but ulti-
mately worked out a plan by which Feldmann's stock (and stock
owned by his family and associates) was purchased at a price of
twenty dollars per share, a substantial premium over the market
price of about twelve dollars per share. The stock sold by Feld-
mann constituted about 37% of the outstanding voting stock. Con-
trol was transferred to Wilport apparently by the seriatim
resignations of Feldmann's directors and the substitution of Wil-
port's nominees.
This case seems to involve a misappropriation of a corporate
asset-the opportunity to merge on favorable terms- which would
have benefited all the shareholders if the corporate transaction had
been permitted to proceed; the case has been so explained. 2 On the
other hand, other commentary argues strongly that the case can
only be explained on the basis of a broader principle of sharing of
control premiums generally. 3 A dispute over the scope and mean-
ing of this decision was almost inevitable, given the opacity of Judge
80. Other early cases that arguably fit into this category include Dunnett v. Am, 71
F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934); American Trust Co. v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 15
Cal. 2d 42, 98 P.2d 497 (1940). These early cases all involve an element of deception or
nondisclosure as well as a pure sale of control.
81. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
82. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505, 515 (1965).
83. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628, 634
(1965).
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Clark's majority opinion; a commentary on God, country, mother-
hood, and fiduciary duties in general, with no indication of precisely
what fiduciary duty Feldmann violated. 84
D. Fiduciary Duty
A few courts have approached sale of control cases by analogy
to cases which hold that officers and directors may have fiduciary
duties to shareholders in connection with transactions in which they
purchase or sell shares of the corporation.8" To recognize a fiduci-
ary duty in all sale of control cases would, of course, virtually re-
verse the "long established law" that permits controlling
shareholders to sell their shares at whatever price they can negotiate
without any obligation to share the premium with other sharehold-
ers. It is clear that most courts are unwilling to adopt such a broad
principle; the actual cases that discuss or apply fiduciary duty con-
cepts, in connection with transactions in control, involve complicat-
ing facts.
Perhaps the case that comes closest to accepting a broad fiduci-
ary principle in a sale of control case is Brown v. Halbert.86 The
majority shareholder of a saving and loan association received an
inquiry into whether the association was for sale. He stated the as-
sociation was not for sale but that he and his wife would consider
selling their stock. A sale was arranged at over $1500 per share,
two and one-half times book value. The purchasers simultaneously
offered the minority shareholders $300 per share; and the majority
shareholder, before the closing of his sale, assisted the new purchas-
ers by encouraging the minority shareholders to accept the $300
price.8
7
84. Judge Clark ordered the case remanded to ascertain the amount of the control pre-
mium received by Feldmann, and directed that this premium should be shared only with
shareholders of Newport other than Wilport. On remand, Judge Anderson determined that
the "enterprise value" of a share of Newport stock "shorn of control" was $14.67, so that
Feldmann had received a premium of $5.33 per share, or a total premium of $2,126,280.
Following the directions of the appellate court, Judge Anderson entered judgment for the
plaintiffs representing 63% of the stock ($1,339,769) plus interest. Penman v. Feldmann, 154
F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
85. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (holding that an officer or director
may be required to disclose "special facts" to a shareholder in connection with the purchase
or sale of shares).
86. Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
87. He did this by advising shareholders that the new majority shareholders planned to
pay high salaries to themselves so that no dividends would be paid for a considerable number
of years, and the shareholders should accept the $300 price because if they did not, they
might not get anything. The price offered to the minority shareholders was later increased to
$611 per share and several shareholders sold at that higher price.
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On these facts, the court held that the selling shareholder had a
fiduciary duty to the minority. Since he acquired "an advantage"
over the other shareholders, he had the burden of proof that receipt
of the advantage was justified. The court stated:
Every sale of a block of control stock should not per se be subject
to attack, but where the amount received by the majority-direc-
tor seller is so disproportionate to the price available to the mi-
nority stockholders, then such fiduciary-seller must show that no
advantage was taken if the sale is questioned. This is especially
true in the instant case where Halbert in his triple fiduciary ca-
pacity was completely indifferent to his obligations to the minor-
ity stockholders. He did not advise the directors or stockholders
that he had been approached by persons who desired to acquire
the Association. After obtaining an agreement for the price he
desired for his own stock and while still an officer-director, he
failed to make any effort to obtain for the minority substantially
the same price that he received and, in fact, worked actively for
the buyers in assisting them to acquire all the stocks at a low
figure by voicing his recommendation to the minority holders
that they sell at below book value. Halbert's other actions in
permitting the buyers access to the books, records and reports of
the Association, and his agreement to refrain from the payment
of dividends only serve to fortify the conclusion that he worked
to obtain an advantage for himself and effectively placed the buy-
ers of his stock in a position to dictate terms to the detriment of
the minority holders. Further, in advising the minority stock-
holders to sell their stock for $300 or they might get nothing, he
was using his office, experience and reputation gained in the con-
duct of their affairs to prevent the minority an opportunity to
obtain a higher price for their stock. 8
The second case, 9 a well known decision from California, is not
a true sale of control case, since the majority shareholders of the
savings and loan association did not sell their shares to third per-
sons. Rather, they contributed them to a holding company without
offering a similar opportunity to certain minority shareholders. An
active public market was then created for the holding company
shares, while the market for the underlying savings and loan associ-
ation shares withered away. The court imposed a fiduciary duty,
relying on Perlman v. Feldmann,90 the looting cases, 91 and Brown v.
Halbert. 92 As described by the court,
[m]ajority shareholders may not use their power to control cor-
88. Brown, 271 Cal. App. 2d at 268-69, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92.
89. Jones v. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
90. See supra text accompanying note 81.
91. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
92. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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porate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detri-
mental to the minority. Any use to which they put the
corporation or their power to control the corporation must bene-
fit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with
the proper conduct of the corporation's business.93
This language, of course, should be read as directed at the problem
faced by the court, and not as of general applicability.
Kansas presents the "acid test" for the fiduciary duty concept in
sale of control cases, since it has generally adopted the broadest
view of fiduciary duties between directors and minority sharehold-
ers.94 One would expect that if the fiduciary approach to sale of
control cases was to take root, it would be in Kansas with its well-
developed case law. However, in a word, it hasn't. In Ritchie v.
McGrath,9" the Kansas Court of Appeals squarely adopted the
"long settled law" that controlling shareholders may sell shares at a
premium consistent with their broad fiduciary duty, relying in part
on an earlier Tenth Circuit decision nominally applying Kansas
law.96 When the Tenth Circuit again reviewed Kansas law,97 it held
that Ritchie, rather than the fiduciary duty cases, applied to all
cases involving sale of control in the absence of foreseeable looting
or misrepresentation by the selling shareholder. 9
E. Sale of Control in Closely Held Corporations:
Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure
The discussion to date has largely dealt with sales of control in
publicly held corporations. Similar problems, however, often arise
in corporations which are closely held so that no public market ex-
ists for their shares. Many of the early sale of control cases are of
this type and were traditionally analyzed as simple cases of fraud,
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure. A common fact pattern in-
volved officers or directors assembling blocks of shares by purchas-
93. Jones, 1 Cal. 3d at 108, 460 P.2d at 471, 81 Cal Rptr. at 599.
94. This rule developed in connection with transactions between directors and minority
shareholders. Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952); Sampson v. Hunt, 222 Kan.
268, 564 P.2d 489 (1977); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
These cases generally hold that if a director or managing officer seeks to purchase the
shares of another shareholder and has knowledge affecting the value or price of the shares, he
is under a fiduciary duty to disclose such facts to the shareholders before dealing with them.
The fiduciary duty, however, is expressed in strong and uncompromising terms.
95. Ritchie v. McGrath, 1 Kan. App. 2d 481, 571 P.2d 17 (1977).
96. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969).
97. Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1981).
98. The court also held, however, that the principal lawyer for the corporation, who
negotiated a "finder's fee" to find a purchaser, violated his duty to the minority shareholders
when he obtained the fee from the purchasers of the shares. Id at 998-99.
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ing shares from current shareholders in order to resell them to the
purchaser of control at a higher price.99 These cases often involved
affirmative misrepresentation; where no factual misstatements oc-
curred, some courts permitted the transaction to stand ("there must
be some actual misrepresentation in order to constitute fraud")"°
while others imposed liability for nondisclosure either on the com-
mon law "special facts" doctrine 1 ' or Rule lOb-5.10 2
In the closely held corporation, a sale of control by the majority
shareholders, without offering all shareholders the same terms,
usually presents itself as a two-price problem. The typical case in-
volves a single majority shareholder (or a group of shareholders
that together comprise a majority and who act in concert). Because
the majority shareholder has an absolute majority of the outstand-
ing shares and is unlikely to voluntarily sell his controlling margin
unless he sells his entire interest, there is virtually no possibility that
one or more minority shareholders may ever attain control of the
enterprise. Further, if the minority shareholders are in a position of
antagonism with the majority shareholder, they may be "frozen
out"-entirely excluded from the fruits of share ownership, receiv-
ing neither offices nor dividends except at the sufferance of the ma-
jority shareholder.
A purchaser of the stock owned by the majority shareholder of a
closely held corporation almost certainly will not improve the pros-
pects of minority shareholders if they remain in the venture. The
probability that they will be frozen out from the fruits of share own-
ership is, if anything, higher than it was before. A purchaser of
controlling shares usually wishes to obtain all of the outstanding
shares to avoid nuisance claims and to give him complete discretion
with respect to the use and deployment of the corporate assets. On
99. Many early cases of this type are assembled in Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 738 (1969).
For an analysis of the sale of control issue, largely in terms of misrepresentation and nondis-
closure, see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956). Other
cases find an agency relationship between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders
to whom they gave options or rights to resell their shares. Where the controlling sharehold-
ers secretly resold at a higher price than paid to the minority, liability was imposed. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Pitkin, 231 Mich. 621, 204 N.W. 750 (1925); Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203
N.W. 414 (1925); Tuller v. Swift, 113 Minn. 263, 129 N.W. 572 (1911).
100. Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 539, 90 N.W. 406, 410 (1902).
101. See, eg., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). It should be noted, in passing, that if the minority
shareholders are not solicited to sell their shares (as is true in all of the sale of control cases
discussed earlier), no violation of Rule lob-5 has occurred because the plaintiff is not a pur-
chaser or seller of shares under the Birnbaum doctrine. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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the other hand, if the minority shareholders demand a price that the
new purchaser feels is too high, the purchaser is often willing to
leave the minority shares outstanding, planning to pick them up at a
favorable price at some later date. In order to assure that the mi-
nority shareholders recognize that there is little point in rejecting
offers in order to wait for better ones, the new majority shareholder
usually will routinely exercise his power of control to freeze out the
minority shareholders and deny them any substantial return on
their investment. All of this tends to lead to a two-price offer to
majority. and minority shareholders.
When a two-price structure is established by the purchaser of
the controlling shares of a closely held corporation, the modem
practice is to make full disclosure to the minority shareholders that
the majority shareholder has been offered a higher price for his
shares."0 3 This disclosure often creates a strong negative visceral
reaction on the part of minority shareholders. They do not accept
kindly the proposition that the majority shareholder should take a
portion of the sale's proceeds that is disproportionate to his interest
in the corporation, though the case law seems to contemplate that
result.1" On the other hand, a decision not to sell their shares
seems to offer an even bleaker prospect.
Many lawyers, I believe, feel that there is something a little
"sharp" about offering significantly different prices for otherwise
identical shares under these circumstances, and that the possibility
of litigation cannot be discounted if the purchaser and seller of the
control shares exploit their powers over the minority shareholder to
the fullest. As a result, many of these transactions are structured as
single price transactions from the outset, even though the pure eco-
nomic power of the parties would seem to dictate a very high price
for the controlling shares and a "nuisance value" nominal price for
the minority shares. It should be added that, in these situations, the
selling majority shareholder often obtains an employment or con-
sulting contract with the purchasers ("to assure a smooth transi-
tion"). A two-price structure may in fact, therefore, continue to
exist to some degree even in a nominally one-price transaction if all
the economic benefits of the transaction are totaled up.
Economists are apparently not troubled by a two-price structure
when they are presented with a hypothetical problem involving the
103. This is a result of the possible liability for nondisclosure under Rule lOb-5.
104. See supra text accompanying note 100. Where full disclosure occurs, neither Rule
iOb-5 nor the "special facts" doctrine has any application.
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sale of control of a closely held corporation. This reaction may be
based on the theory that a two-price structure seems reasonable,
since a majority block of shares is quite a different "good" than a
minority block. The injustice to minority shareholders is not recog-
nized or, if recognized, is viewed as the unfortunate consequence of
a misjudgment made by the minority shareholders at some earlier
time. This injustice may also be viewed as part of the acceptable
cost of attaining economic efficiency.
Alternatively, economic analysis may view the closely held cor-
poration as involving an indeterminate problem, since economic
analysis deals with markets and not with transactions which basi-
cally involve barter or individual negotiation between two or three
persons. In this connection, an observation by Easterbrook and Fis-
chel 0 deserves repeating: They suggest that minority shareholders
can avoid unfortunate results in this situation, if they wish, by elect-
ing not to invest in closely held enterprises. Such advice obviously
provides little solace for the unfortunate person who inherits minor-
ity shares or invests in a corporation on the mistaken belief that
amicable relations will continue.
F. New Developments and New Trends
The "long settled law" relating to sale of control of publicly held
corporations is being influenced, in some immeasurable way, by the
development of cash tender offers and other takeover devices and by
legislative responses to these devices. When outside interests make
an unwanted offer to purchase for cash a majority of the outstand-
ing shares of a publicly held corporation at a substantial premium
over current market price, the offer has some superficial resem-
blance to the sale of control transactions discussed in this Article.1"6
This relationship between two apparently widely disparate phe-
105. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
106. The analogy is superficially even closer in the "front-end loaded" tender offers,
where the aggressor announces a high price for 50% of the outstanding shares together with a
plan to obtain the balance of the shares at a considerably lower price if the first offer is
successful. The two-price structure warps the decision whether or not to tender, however,
and is therefore also not analogous to traditional sale of control cases. It warps the decision
because it introduces a type of "prisoner's dilemma": whether or not to tender.
A rational shareholder, faced with a front-end loaded offer, should logically look at the
blended price in order to determine whether to tender (since, if the blended price is attractive,
all shareholders will tender, and each will sell half his shares at the front-end price and half at
the back-end price). If the blended price is unattractive, however, the shareholder faces the
classic dilemma: if he rejects the unattractive blended price, he may end up having all his
shares purchased at the "back-end" price, if other shareholders tender and receive a dispro-
portionate part of the front-end price. Since his strategy depends on the strategy of other
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nomena has an unexpected impact on the sale of control cases: the
apparent applicability of state anti-takeover statutes and proposed
federal regulations 1°7 to these quite different transactions. The stat-
utes discussed here are post-Mite1 8 responses by state legislatures
to the concerns of incumbent management to unwanted takeover
attempts. Any application of them to the sale of control problem
discussed here is entirely fortuitous. The statutes of several
states,10 9 and their possible application to sale of control cases, are
discussed below.
1. Ohio.
In 1983, Ohio enacted a statute applicable to "control share ac-
quisitions" of an "issuing public corporation" that appears to cover
many private sale of control cases.110 An "issuing public corpora-
tion" is a corporation with fifty or more shareholders with substan-
tial economic contacts with Ohio. A "control share acquisition" is
the acquisition of shares that puts the aggregate ownership of the
holder through one or more of several critical ownership levels:
one-fifth, one-third, and one-half. A control share acquisition is
permitted under the Ohio statute only if a meeting of the sharehold-
ers approves the control share acquisition "by an affirmative vote of
a majority of the voting power of such corporation in the election of
directors represented at such meeting in person or by proxy, and a
majority of the portion of such voting power excluding the voting
power of interested shares.""'1 "Interested shares" are defined to be
shares owned by the purchaser or any officer or director/employee
shareholders, he may tender despite the unattractiveness of the blended price because of the
structure of the offer.
107. The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, in its report of July 8, 1983, pro-
posed that no person may acquire voting securities of an issuer registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 if, immediately following such acquisition, the person owned more
than 20% of the voting power of the securities of the issuer except (i) from the issuer, or (ii)
pursuant to a tender offer. Reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP'. (CCI-) % 83,511 (Mar. 28, 1984).
The apparent target of this recommendation was "creeping" open market purchases of
control, but it literally also covers a negotiated private purchase of controlling shares from
one shareholder or group of shareholders. John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, subsequently testified that "[t]he Commission has serious reserva-
tions about this recommendation. Further study of the economic implications for the entire
change of control area is required." Id. It appears unlikely that such a major change in
principle will be adopted in the near future.
108. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1981).
109. No attempt is made here to determine whether these statutes are constitutional
under the principles of the Mite case.
110. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(Y), (Z), 1701.83.1 (Page Supp. 1983).
111. Id. at § 1701.83.1(E)(1) (emphasis added).
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of the corporation." 2 In other words, any person who attempts to
buy shares that puts him through the 20%, 33% or 50% levels,
may buy them only with the affirmative vote of a majority of the
shares not owned by the acquiring person or persons affiliated with
the corporation. If this statute is constitutional, it appears to grant
the minority shareholders the unlimited power to veto the acquisi-
tion of control shares, and in some unpredictable, erratic manner
may serve to compel the sharing of premiums in control share
transactions. 113
2. Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania statute differs from the Ohio statute in several
important respects: It only applies to corporations registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1" and it does not condition a
purchase upon the affirmative vote of other shareholders. Rather, it
requires every person or group who acquires "voting power over
voting shares of the corporation that would entitle the holders
thereof to cast at least 30% of the votes that all shareholders would
be entitled to cast in an election of directors," to agree to purchase
the shares owned by other shareholders upon a request made
"within a reasonable time." '115 The cash price for those shares must
be "equal to the fair value of each voting share as of the day prior to
the date on which the control transaction occurs, taking into ac-
count all relevant factors, including an increment representing a
proportion of any value payable for acquisition of control of the
corporation."' 16
This provision appears to require any purchaser of control, in a
negotiated transaction, from the controlling shareholder (so long as
the block exceeds 30% of the voting shares) to offer to purchase the
shares of all other shareholders at a fair price. This provision may
possibly be avoided by buying 29.9% of the shares at a high price
accompanied by a transfer of control accomplished by a seriatim
112. Md at § 17.01(CC).
113. The full implications of this section are difficult to foresee because of the bizarre way
in which "interested shares" are defined. Shares being acquired are apparently not "inter-
ested shares" if they are purchased from persons unaffiliated with the management of the
corporation. It may be that some purchasers of control shares who already own minority
interests may avoid the statute by agreeing to buy minority shares from outsiders as well as
from officers or directors of the corporation in order to vote the minority shares to authorize
the transaction.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(G) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
115. Id. §§ 1910(B)(1), 1910(D).
116. Id. § 1910(E).
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resignation of directors. It may also be possible to buy 30.1% at a
lower price, await a "reasonable time" for the expiration of ap-
praisal rights under section 1910 and then buy the balance of the
shares owned by the majority shareholder at a much higher price.
This second transaction does not violate the statute because the ap-
praisal-type right is triggered under the Pennsylvania statute only
by breaking the 30% level. Such a strategy would apparently not
avoid the shareholder approval requirements in Ohio, since that
state's statute has three separate "triggering" levels.
3. Indiana and Hawaii.
Indiana and Hawaii also have statutes designed to reach the
problem of unwanted takeover attempts in which follow-up offers
are made at significantly lower prices than the original offers. These
statutes basically require follow-up transactions within two years to
be at the original offer price. However, they apparently do not
reach private sale of control transactions by a small group of con-
trolling shareholders. The Hawaii statute applies only to "takeover
bids" that are defined to be offers, excluding "an isolated offer to
purchase shares from individual stockholders and not made to
stockholders generally."' 17 Indiana similarly applies its statutes
(requiring follow-up offers at "substantially equivalent terms")" 8
only to offers to acquire shares "pursuant to a tender offer or re-
quest or invitation for tenders."''
9
IV. CONCLUSION
Much of the legal literature relating to the "sale of control"
cases is dated and relies heavily on broad philosophical arguments
based on cases decided during the 1950's and 1960's. Whatever the
original meaning of these cases, they have not led to the judicial
development of a general principle requiring sharing of control pre-
miums foreseen by the writers during the 1960's. Indeed, the "long
settled law" that control premiums generally may be obtained by
controlling shareholders without any requirement of sharing them
with other shareholders appears to be indeed "settled" as of 1985.
Economists applaud this result. On the other hand, there are excep-
tions to this "long settled" rule which have sufficient breadth and
flexibility that abusive transactions can apparently be attacked suc-
117. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1(7), (8) (1976).
118. Ind. Gen. Corp. Law, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-8.4 (West Supp. 1983).
119. Id. § 23-2-3.1-1.
[Vol. 36:248
PRIVATE SALE OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
cessfully. Lawyers, I assume, applaud this result even though
economists may not like this kind of ex post analysis. Not finding
the economists' objections to these exceptions particularly persua-
sive,t2 ' I conclude that the legal system appears, by chance and by
common sense, to have reached a reasonably optimum point on the
"efficiency/injustice" scale on this relatively narrow issue.
Finally, the modem law of sale of control transactions has de-
veloped unanswered issues arising under post-Mite state tender offer
statutes that await resolution. These issues may be resolved either
in a broad constitutional attack against all such statutes or in their
individual application to specific cases for which the statutes do not
appear to have been designed. The application of these statutes to
the sale of control issues under consideration here appear to be un-
intentional and, as a result, potentially quixotic. If statutes of these
types are ultimately upheld, they should be limited to the situations
to which they are directed and not applied indiscriminately to pri-
vate sale of control cases.
120. The attack on the looting exception by economists appears to be unpersuasive, since
it is based on assumption and assertion. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53. I assume
that the great insight of the economists-that legal rules should be judged from an "ex ante"
as well as an "ex post" perspective-does not mean that all "ex post" prescriptions are auto-
matically uneconomic.
